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In his thoughtful and provocative article, Professor Ronald 
Rotunda offers several arguments against “constitutionalizing 
judicial ethics,” especially criticizing the majority in Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
1
 because he, echoing Chief Justice John 
Roberts in dissent, believes it offers “no coherent and reasonably 
clear theory of judicial disqualification.”2  It appears to be his 
hope that a future court might reverse this decision, and allow 
judges to be the sole assessors of judicial partiality.  Despite 
Professor Rotunda‟s reservations, many good reasons support 
the Caperton majority, which requires federal, constitutional 
oversight of a state judge who refuses to recuse from 
participation in a case involving that judge‟s patron.   
In this brief essay, I will relate just two reasons that support 
Caperton’s result.  First, though Caperton may indeed interject 
greater federal oversight of state judges as well as new oversight 
of the judges of courts of last resort, Caperton does not add a 
new review for most judges.  Second, the due process of law 
must protect litigants from apparent corruption, or it cannot 
protect them from real corruption. 
 
        
*
Judge William H. Enfield Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.  This 
symposium essay is written in celebration of the life of Judge Enfield, who provided a 
model of rectitude for the bench as well as the bar, and in gratitude for the efforts of two 
former justices, Sandra Day O‟Conner and Annabelle Imber Tuck, whose retirements from 
their respective benches have been spent in diligent attempts to improve the integrity of the 
bench and bar. 
1. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
2. Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutionalizing Judicial Ethics: Judicial Elections After 
Republican Party v. White, Caperton, and Citizens United, 64 ARK. L. REV. 1 (2011).  
Chief Justice Roberts argued that asking what a judge‟s probability of bias might be is too 
vague.  Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267.  Justice Scalia separately argued that the standard 
would invite a wave of cases alleging bias in states, like Arkansas, that have an elected 
judiciary.  Id. at 2274. 
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As an initial matter, though, remember Caperton as a 
precedent.  And, thankfully, Caperton is a precedent.
3
  The case 
arose in a messy lawsuit between two West Virginia energy 
companies—Harman Mining, headed by Hugh Caperton, and 
the A.T. Massey Coal Company, headed by Don Blankenship—
which had gone to trial in 2002, resulting in a $50 million jury 
verdict for Caperton‟s Harman Mining.  Massey appealed the 
verdict.  While the appeal moved up, Don Blankenship created a 
nonprofit entity that supported Brent Benjamin, a candidate 
challenging the state chief justice for reelection.  He and his 
political 527 corporation spent $3 million campaigning for 
Benjamin, who was elected.  When Blankenship‟s case reached 
the state supreme court of appeals, Justice Benjamin, who had 
since been seated, refused to recuse himself, claiming that he 
would be unbiased in Massey‟s case.4  Benjamin cast one of the 
deciding votes in a 3-2 decision to overturn the verdict.  
Caperton took the case to the United States Supreme Court, 
claiming that Harmon Mining, which was now defunct, had 
been denied due process of law by Benjamin‟s vote.5 
Justice Kennedy and a majority agreed.  Due process of law 
forbids a judge to sit on a case involving a party who has just 
paid for that judge‟s election to the bench.6  More to the point, 
every litigant in a court in the United States has a right to a 
judge who has not just been placed on the bench by that 
litigant‟s opponent.7  The right to fair trial cannot allow such a 
blatant challenge to judicial neutrality.  There was no evidence 
of bribery, solicitation, a debt by Benjamin to Blankenship, a 
family relationship, or even a direct gift from Blankenship to 
Benjamin, or any evidence of actual bias by Benjamin.  Yet, the 
influence Blankenship had exerted to elect Benjamin was still 
likely to have influence.  Justice Kennedy resolved: 
[T]here is a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective 
and reasonable perceptions—when a person with a personal 
stake in a particular case had a significant and  
 
3. See Precedent, THE BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY, q.v. (Stephen Sheppard, ed.) 
(Wolters Kluwer, 2011)(forthcoming). 
4. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009). 
5. The facts are set out in the opinions and in the briefs.  See generally id. 
6. See Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2265. 
7. See id. 
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disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case 
by raising funds or directing the judge‟s election campaign 
when the case was pending or imminent. The inquiry 
centers on the contribution‟s relative size in comparison to 
the total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the 
total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect 
such contribution had on the outcome of the election.
8
 
The majority set no further analysis in place.  At some 
point, a patron‟s influence on a judge‟s election has to be so 
great that an appearance of influence is present when the judge 
rules on a case involving that patron.
9
  Due process of law 
cannot force another litigant to appear against a patron before 
such an apparently tainted judge. 
The question, “at what point,” is serious, and Chief Justice 
Roberts emphasized it in an inventory of forty unanswered 
questions.
10
  Yet answers to many of these questions have been 
quick in coming, and not as Chief Justice Roberts forecast, 
through a wave of petitions of certiorari, but by careful and 
measured reevaluations of recusal in the states.  Michigan, for 
instance, has created an en banc review de novo for a denied 
recusal motion.
11
 
I.  JUDGES BEAR LITTLE NEW BURDEN FROM THE 
CONSTITUTION 
The real question in Caperton was not whether a judge 
should recuse when a patron stands before that judge as a 
litigant.  The real question was whether a judge is subject to 
review when the judge refuses to do so. 
First, there was no real question that under West Virginia 
law, Justice Benjamin was required to recuse, and he violated 
the state‟s law by not doing so.  As Justice Kennedy pointed out, 
“The West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct also requires a 
judge to „disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which 
 
8. Id. at 2263. 
9. For more ranting on this point, see Steve Sheppard, Supreme Court Bans Judge 
Buying, FINDLAW, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20090629_sheppard.html 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2011). 
10. 129 S. Ct. at 2269-72. 
11. See Mich. Ct. R. 2000.3 (2009). 
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the judge‟s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.‟”12  Yet 
as a judge on the highest state court, the only immediate arbiter 
of Justice Benjamin‟s motion to recuse was, at that point, 
himself.  He wrote four opinions rejecting such standards as 
appearance of impropriety, arguing that only “objective 
information” that he had prejudged the case or that he would be 
unfair or impartial would do.
13
  There was, however, no 
procedure that allowed a review of this opinion, though it 
applied an erroneous legal standard under state law. 
For the overwhelming number of judges, review of such a 
mistaken recusal was possible long before Caperton.  Indeed, 
for by far the greater numbers of judges, review of denied 
recusal was already available in another court, which may apply 
standards for recusal through direct appeal, as well as by a writ 
of mandamus or a writ of prohibition.
14
  The primary difference 
made by the Caperton rule is that the United States Supreme 
Court has said that due process of law now allows a federal 
review of a state judge‟s refusal to recuse, when there is unusual 
evidence of an appearance of undue influence by a patron who is 
a litigant before that judge.
15
 
 
 
 
12. 129 S. Ct. at 2266 (quoting W.V. Canon Judicial Ethics 3E(1)).  Justice Kennedy 
also quoted a recent case emphasizing the requirement to recuse when a question arises, 
regardless of the judge‟s purity of motive.  See id. (quoting State ex rel. Brown v. Dietrick, 
191 W. Va. 169, 174, n. 9, 444 S. E. 2d 47, 52, n. 9 (1994)(“The question of 
disqualification focuses on whether an objective assessment of the judge‟s conduct 
produces a reasonable question about impartiality, not on the judge‟s subjective perception 
of the ability to act fairly.”)). 
13. See Brief for Petitioner, No. 08-22 at 10, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 
S.Ct. 2252 (2009) (quoting Opinion (Apr. 7, 2006)). 
14. See, e.g., In re United States, 441 F.3d 44, 68 (1st Cir. 2006) (ordering recusal of 
a federal district judge who had refused to recuse himself, noting that, “The appellate court 
is more removed and hence more objective.”). 
15. Indeed, for all state judges, some review for failure to recuse was possible before 
Caperton.  The Due Process Clause had already been read to bar a state judge from hearing 
a case in which the judge had a direct interest related to a litigant or to an outcome.  See 
generally Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).  
Further, the Court had already stated that a judge‟s interest in other, similar litigation was 
sufficient evidence of apparent influence to require due process review.  Aetna Life Ins. 
Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813  (1986).  The additional review required in the light of 
Caperton is only the degree to which a judge appears interested when a patron, a party 
whose unusual influence or money creates the appearance of obligation by the judge to the 
patron, refuses to recuse in a cause in which the patron has an interest. 
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II.  THE APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION CAN HIDE 
TRUE CORRUPTION 
The problem is not limited to elected judges; it is just more 
obvious with elected judges.  When a judge owes a favor to a 
litigant, or is in a circumstance that would seem to owe a favor 
to a litigant, it is hard for that litigant‟s opponent to believe 
fairness is at hand in the courtroom.  When that favor reaches a 
level of patronage, it does not matter whether the litigant paid 
for an election or invoked senatorial courtesy.  A litigant who 
was a significant influence in the judge‟s holding the judgeship 
presents a presumptive conflict of interest for that judge. 
Why, then can a judge not see this?  In my experience, 
most judges quietly do see it and seek not to have such cases 
assigned or recuse themselves sua sponte. 
When a judge won‟t recuse in a case involving a party who 
was clearly a patron to that judge, the stakes simply rise too 
quickly.  Why won‟t the judge step aside? 
There are times, of course, when motions to recuse are 
brought tactically by an opponent to a former patron, seeking to 
amplify the appearance of obligation of the judge toward a 
former sponsor.  Such motions are likely to provoke anger, 
resentment, and defiance in the judge whose impartiality is 
questioned.  Even so, there is simply no loss to justice in that 
judge stepping aside and allowing another judge to be assigned.  
The appearance of impropriety is all that is in issue, not 
impropriety itself. 
Moreover, there are two distinct reasons why the judge 
should recuse when a patron is before the bench. One of these 
was apparent in the Caperton case, the other was not but was the 
unremarked elephant in the room. 
As was discussed by Justice Kennedy for the Court, the 
other litigant has a right to a fair trial.  No amount of reassurance 
by the seemingly tainted judge can assure the litigant that the 
judge is not tainted.  And, the litigant has a fundamental right to 
a neutral judge, who is not apparently biased against that 
litigant‟s cause. 
As was not discussed here but even more fundamental, the 
people have a right to judges who are in fact not bought off by 
their patrons.  As election funding becomes more powerful and 
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more subtle, and as the politics of selection make back-room 
politics in judicial selection more important to political and 
commercial interests, the opportunity grows for real corruption 
that is not provable by “objective” relationships of payment or 
promise. 
All of the evidence suggests that Justice Benjamin was—in 
fact—independent of Don Blankenship and uninfluenced by his 
money.  All of the evidence suggests that the justice had no 
more than a tin ear to the cries of his opponents who said his 
opinion looked like it had been bought by the man it favored. 
But what if Justice Benjamin had actually been crooked?  
When a judge does act from a sense of obligation toward a 
patron-litigant, there is no reason to believe that either the patron 
or the judge would be so naive as to write a contract or make 
direct payments.  There would probably be no evidence of the 
forms that Justice Benjamin demanded be produced before he 
would step down.  If he were as corrupt as his detractors 
thought, the evidence would probably have looked very much 
the same. 
The appearance of impropriety is essential as a standard to 
assure the absence of impropriety.  Nothing less can assure the 
integrity of the American bench,which must certainly be a 
fundamental purpose of the due process of law. 
 
